New Questions of Evidence: Comment on Shore and Wright's 'Audit Culture Revisited: Rankings, Ratings, and the Reassembling of Society' by Maguire, Mark
Mark Maguire 
Department of Anthropology, Maynooth University, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland 
(mark.h.maguire@nuim.ie). 4 XI 14 
New Questions of Evidence 
In 2012, an Irish magazine introduced the Dublin-based director of “government services” at 
one of the Big Four auditing firms. The executive spoke from expertise in organizational 
change: transparency and efficiency would inevitably flow, he explained, from reengineering 
state institutions to be measurably customer focused according to best practice. The magazine 
provided another update on the quiet revolution that Shore and Wright have tracked for more 
than a decade—the relentless rise of audit culture. But, in this instance, the ideological 
language was exposed by broader circumstances. In 2012, the same firm was sued by the 
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) over its role in auditing Anglo Irish Bank, the 
collapse of which cost the state approximately $40 billion, or 20% of GDP. Nine days before 
the bank was nationalized, Merrill Lynch gave it a clean bill of health in a report costing 
approximately $11 million (incidentally, the IBRC appointed another Big Four firm as its 
auditor). Business as usual. 
The recent financial crisis called attention to the opaque world of global actors who audit, 
produce rankings, indicators, and transparency. When accused of negligence or sharp 
practice, they defend themselves with the nineteenth-century mantra, “We are watchdogs, not 
bloodhounds.” Yet, as Shore and Wright note, they overproduce quasiempirical language and 
sign their activities as evidence based. As I reflect on recent history, questions about evidence 
spring to mind. The official inquiry into Irish banking was a toothless process—as in the 
blinding of Polyphemus, “Nobody” was to blame—but it was revealing. The sector was 
accused of diverting masses of risk analysis professionals to deal with international Basel II 
standards. Evidence of actual risk became secondary to mimetic self-regulation indicators 
derived from abstract quantitative models. Anthropology is certainly equipped to study 
mimesis, rituals of evidence gathering, and “the magic of numbers” (Merry 2011:S84). 
Anthropology must reengage with questions of evidence and harness some of its most 
intellectually rewarding concepts as it does so. 
Shore and Wright’s article aims to cut to the heart of the rationales driving and legitimizing 
so-called audit culture. Similarly, Sally Engle Merry’s recent Current Anthropology article 
“Measuring the World” (2011) examines the contemporary plague of indicators and rankings. 
These articles should be read together, because the authors provide different genealogies of 
audits and indicators that might be productively brought into dialogue. Shore and Wright 
begin with the calculative styles of reasoning born in grading and ranking at West Point and 
École Polytechnique before tracking the rise of scientific management and new public 
management. They show the remarkable resilience of these styles of reasoning in the face of 
numerous failures. But Merry’s genealogy of indicators offers to them interesting challenges. 
She draws on historian Mary Poovey (1998) to explore the rise of “the modern fact,” the 
ostensibly neutral and systematic basis of statistical and governmental reasoning by experts. 
The nineteenth-century shift from moral knowledge to statistical-governmental knowledge 
may have provoked merciless sarcasm from Charles Dickens, but it also provoked important 
scientific debates. “Statistics,” William Robertson argued, “is not even a department of 
human knowledge; it is merely a form of knowledge—a mode of arranging and stating facts” 
(quoted in Poovey 1998:316; see also Poovey 1993). But the problem here exceeds the 
questionable evidential basis of governmental knowledge. We must attend also to the magic 
and necromancy inherent in rendering into numbers the characteristics of populations. Many 
nineteenth-century statisticians eschewed “causes” yet found mesmerizing patterns in data. 
William Cook Taylor stared at lists of murders in France until he saw “a certain sympathy or 
principle of imitation” (1835:113). What is at stake in these early examples is the potential 
power of data qua data. 
Today, as nurseries and even mortuaries face audits, rankings, and indicators, questions about 
evidence are foregrounded. Similarly, in my own field of security research, one may note the 
rise and resilience of scenarios and foresighting by experts. Quasiempirical yet ostensibly 
evidence-based, quasicorporate yet rampant across society, these forms of knowledge 
demand anthropological attention. Shore and Wright have provided an important service here 
by revisiting audit culture and its (perverse) effects. One may, however, add to their ongoing 
work by highlighting a broader genealogy and what that makes possible. For instance, they 
note the Amazon UK warehouses in which stressed workers are controlled by omniscient 
time-and-motion technology. But today, data qua data is taking on new forms scarcely 
imaginable in the past. Today, such workers are controlled, measured, and ranked as coded 
data that must respond to algorithms scraping “big data” for magical insights into consumer 
behaviors. It was a broader genealogy that provoked Gilles Deleuze to picture “transmutable 
or transformable coded configurations of a single business where the only people left are 
administrators” (1995:181). 
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